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INTRODUCTION 
To students of Civil Procedure, and those like me who teach them, 
the “minimum contacts” test that International Shoe Co. v. Washington1 
announced is seen as the beginning of time for evaluating the 
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 1 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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constitutionality of state court and (by application of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure2) most federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction.  
Some meanies like me make students read Pennoyer v. Neff,3 which they 
generally find impenetrable.  Particularly since Pennoyer was sort of 
overruled, at least in part,4 students (who then become lawyers and judges) 
are left with the notion that Pennoyer was the case that, by invoking the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 turned personal 
jurisdiction into a constitutional subject.6 I have argued at length that this 
is a debatable proposition.7 
For quite awhile, we teachers didn’t have anything new to cover 
when it came to the minimum contacts test.  Until 2011, the last decision 
in which a majority of Supreme Court justices discussed the minimum 
contacts test was in the splintered opinions in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court,8 where the Court divided four to four on the question of 
whether a component manufacturer generally could be sued in a state in 
which the component was foreseeably resold as part of a finished product.  
Four Justices said the answer to that question is usually yes,9 four said 
usually no,10 and Justice Stevens wouldn’t say one way or the other.11  
Remarkably, the Court ruled unanimously that the component 
manufacturer wasn’t subject to jurisdiction because it would be 
unreasonable to do so even if there were minimum contacts.12 
The lack of clarity left matters in a less-than-ideal position, but the 
Supreme Court said nothing on the topic for a quarter century.  The closest 
the Court came was a 1990 decision reaffirming in-state service of process 
on an individual defendant as a basis for jurisdiction; four Justices in the 
concurrence purported to do a minimum contacts analysis, but it wasn’t a 
majority opinion.13 
                                                                                                                                     
 2 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
 3 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 4 See Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186, 214 n.39 (1977). 
 5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 6 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
 7 Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction; 
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 38–43 (1990). 
 8 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 9 Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 10 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 11 Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“An 
examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state 
courts assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”). 
 12 Id. at 116 (O’Connor, J.). 
 13 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 636–39 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
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Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court showed interest in the subject 
again, deciding four cases from 2011 to 2014.  In all four cases, the Court 
ruled that the minimum contacts test was not fulfilled.14  The result in three 
of the cases was utterly predictable, as the Court unanimously held that the 
minimum contacts test was not fulfilled.15  Justice Sotomayor, in the fourth 
case, authored a concurrence,16 thus breaking up the Court’s otherwise 
blissful agreement on both rationale and result.  All three of the unanimous 
cases represented wild over-reaches of long-arm jurisdiction by lower 
courts, and the Supreme Court appeared to take the cases mostly as hand-
slapping exercises. 
The most interesting case of the four produced the only non-
unanimous decision.  In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,17 it 
looked as though the Court might resolve the long-simmering debate as to 
the scope of the stream-of-commerce test for product liability cases that 
Asahi left undecided.  As commentators have noted,18 the Court did no 
such thing.  If anything, the Court achieved the remarkable feat of further 
confusing the issue by splitting four to two to three on the rationale.19  
Strangely, this left Justice Breyer’s two-vote concurrence in the judgment 
as the controlling opinion, but his opinion is so narrow it leaves little for 
lower courts to follow.20 
Although many find this surprising, in terms of the results reached, 
the jurisdictional landscape today is not much changed from the pre-
International Shoe days when the “implied consent” rubric was the 
rationale for asserting jurisdiction.  In fact, in some ways the minimum 
contacts test as now applied is less flexible than the old implied consent 
theory.  To be sure, some things have changed.  The collapsing of in rem 
                                                                                                                                     
 14 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 15 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1115; Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 746; Goodyear Dunlop Tire 
Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2846. 
 16 See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 17 131 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 18 See e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence 
of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011); see also Shane 
Yeargan, Note, Purpose and Intent: Seeking a More Consistent Approach to Stream of 
Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 543, 555–56 (2012) (“The Court 
in J. McIntyre largely disappointed those who had hope for clarification of the law of 
stream of commerce jurisdiction.”); Robert M. Pollack, Note, “Not of Any Particular 
State,” J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088, 1103 (2014) (J. McIntyre’s “splintered decision failed to settle 
[stream-of-commerce] doctrine.”). 
 19 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780. 
 20 Borchers, supra note 18, at 1265. 
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into in personam jurisdiction21 is a genuine change from the pre-
International Shoe days, though one that has constricted state-court reach.  
But when it comes to the fundamentals of jurisdiction in tort and contract 
cases and assertions of jurisdiction over corporations, the picture today – 
at least from the standpoint of outcomes – looks remarkably unchanged 
from (perhaps is even more grudging than) the pre-International Shoe era. 
Given the Supreme Court’s adherence to the minimum contacts 
language for seventy years now, it seems unlikely that the vocabulary will 
soon change.  The question rather is whether the vocabulary will continue 
to be a cloak to hide jurisdictional doctrine that is in truth no less rigid than 
that of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  The minimum contacts 
test is in its twilight because it has become almost completely separated 
from the fairness rationale that underlay the test as it was originally 
conceived.  So while the minimum contacts language will almost certainly 
persist, the test as a meaningful exposition of the Due Process Clause may 
not live to see the next dawn, if indeed it is still alive at all. 
Part I will briefly review the Supreme Court’s four new cases.  Part 
II will survey the jurisdictional landscape as it existed before International 
Shoe was decided in 1945.  Finally,  Part III  offers a modest proposal to 
return the test to its basic fairness origins. 
I.  THE COURT’S RESURGENT INTEREST IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Because each new personal jurisdiction opinion begets a flood of 
commentary, I will endeavor to be as brief as possible in recounting the 
new decisions.  In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,22 the Supreme 
Court faced a product liability action that an injured industrial worker 
brought against the English manufacturer of the allegedly defective 
machine that caused the accident.23  Because the machine had not been 
sold directly to a buyer in the plaintiff’s home state of New Jersey, but 
rather through an Ohio-based independent distributor, the case presented 
a question of stream-of-commerce jurisdiction.24  Justice Kennedy 
authored a four-vote plurality opinion which held that there was no 
jurisdiction because of a lack of a direct effort to serve the forum state 
market.25  The plurality noted the absence of any evidence in the record 
                                                                                                                                     
 21 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 22 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780. 
 23 Id. at 2786. 
 24 Id. at 2788 (The stream of commerce “refers to the movement of goods from 
manufacturers through distributors to consumers, yet beyond that descriptive purpose its 
meaning is far from exact.”). 
 25 Id. at 2790–91. 
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that the English manufacturer was specifically targeting the forum state.26  
The plurality also attempted to revive the sovereignty strand of jurisdiction 
– that is, the notion that jurisdictional limits exist in part to check the 
breadth of state authority—which has appeared episodically in Supreme 
Court opinions.27  The plurality reasoned that while one function of 
jurisdiction is to protect defendants from unfair assertions of jurisdiction, 
another was to constrain the sovereignty of states.28 
Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion,29 concurring in the judgment—
joined only by Justice Alito—refused to endorse the plurality’s broad 
rationale.30  Justice Breyer emphasized that the record showed that only 
one such machine had been sold in New Jersey.31  Purporting to adhere 
closely to the Court’s minimum contacts precedents, the concurrence in 
the judgment reasoned that one drop could not fill the metaphorical 
streambed needed to keep afloat an assertion of jurisdiction.32  Justice 
Breyer saw the J. McIntyre facts as similar to those in World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson,33 in which the Court ruled that the injury state 
did not have jurisdiction over an out-of-state seller of a car, because the 
car dealership (and its regional distributor) had made no effort to serve the 
forum state’s market.34 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion vehemently rejected the 
plurality’s sovereignty rationale.35  She emphasized that the English 
manufacturer saw the United States as a single market and that the sale of 
a machine in New Jersey was utterly foreseeable.36  She also emphasized 
the unfairness of leaving the injured worker with no practical forum in 
which to pursue his case and, in her view, the absurdity of giving what 
                                                                                                                                     
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 2787–87; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980). 
 28 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787. 
 29 See supra note 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 30 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 31 Id. at 2791–92. 
 32 Id. at 2792 (“a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate 
basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places 
his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take 
place”). 
 33 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 34 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-
98). 
 35 Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“the constitutional limits on a state court’s 
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state sovereignty”). 
 36 Id. at 2801. 
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amounted to jurisdictional immunity to the English manufacturer when the 
manufacturer’s home European jurisdictional scheme would not do so.37 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,38 decided on 
the same day as J. McIntyre, the Court confronted a case in which two 
boys who were members of a soccer team were killed in France, allegedly 
as the result of a defect in a tire manufactured by one of several foreign 
subsidiaries of the U.S. tire giant Goodyear.39  A court in North Carolina 
– the boys’ home state – took jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries 
based on a very small percentage of their tires being sold in North 
Carolina.40  This was an attempted exercise of “general” or “all-purpose” 
jurisdiction, because the forum-state sales were unrelated to the claims.41  
Goodyear was only the third time in the minimum contacts era that the 
Court had decided a general jurisdiction case, and only the second since 
its six-decades-old opinion in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Co.42 
Goodyear’s brief and unanimous opinion held that the North 
Carolina courts had reached too far.43  The Court relied heavily on its 
earlier decision holding that unrelated forum-state purchases by a 
corporate defendant could not sustain jurisdiction.44  The real news from 
the Goodyear decision was that the Court formulated a test for deciding 
whether unrelated contacts met the constitutional threshold.  The Court 
stated that a defendant must have contacts with the forum that make it 
“essentially at home” there.45  That new test prompted a fair amount of 
speculation, with some reading it as limiting jurisdiction to a 
“headquarters” paradigm,46 and others arguing that while the Court’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 37 Id. 
 38 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 39 Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
 40 Id. at 2851. 
 41 Id. at 2854 (“To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over petitioners, North 
Carolina courts relied on the petitioners’ placement of their tires in the ‘stream of 
commerce.’”). 
 42 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  Although it is a debatable reading of the opinion, the Court 
treated Perkins as standing for the proposition that a corporation is subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in the state in which it has its headquarters.  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2856. 
 43 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 44 Id. at 2856 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
418 (1984)). 
 45 Id. at 2851. 
 46 Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in 
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I 
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 1, 4 (2014) (“If what the Court means by 
‘essentially at home’ is that the corporate defendant has its headquarters in the forum, U.S. 
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opinion required a meaningful and permanent connection with the forum, 
it did not limit general jurisdiction to the defendant’s home base.47 
Three years later brought another pair of jurisdictional opinions, both 
reversing extremely aggressive attempted assertions of jurisdiction 
endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.48  In 
Walden v. Fiore, the defendant (who had been deputized to work for the 
federal Drug Enforcement Agency) seized about $97,000 in cash from two 
professional gamblers as they passed through Atlanta, Georgia’s airport 
on their way home to Nevada.49  Apparently the defendant believed that 
the money might be tied to a drug transaction and some months later 
helped draft a “probable cause” affidavit in support of a forfeiture action.50  
However, no forfeiture action was ever filed, and a few months later the 
gamblers had the money returned to them.51 
The gamblers brought a Bivens action52 in Nevada against the federal 
official.  The District Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction over 
the Georgia-based defendant, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.53  The Ninth Circuit’s theory54 was that the defendant’s 
knowledge that the plaintiffs were Nevadans created minimum contacts 
with Nevada, particularly based on his later actions in helping to draft the 
affidavit.55  The plaintiffs and the Ninth Circuit leaned heavily on the 
                                                                                                                                     
plaintiffs could find themselves irrationally disadvantaged in pursuing cases against 
foreign corporate defendants.”); Meir Feder, Goodyear “Home,” and the Uncertain Future 
of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV 671, 677 (2012) (“[T]he Goodyear opinion 
did include several clues suggesting that the Court may have intended the at home standard 
as a narrow one, perhaps extending no further than a corporation’s state of incorporation 
and principal place of business.”). 
 47 Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of 
General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49 (2012). 
 48 Symposium, Ninth Circuit Conference: U.S. Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth 
Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341 (2006) (Over the past fifty years, the Ninth Circuit has been 
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court an average of 10.78 times per term. In contrast, the 
Fifth Circuit was reversed an average of 7.42 times.). 
 49 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 1120. 
 52 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) 
(recognizing a civil cause of action under the Constitution against federal officers who 
deprive citizens of constitutional rights).  In Walden v. Fiore, the plaintiffs alleged a 
violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  134 U.S. 
at 1120. 
 53 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1120. 
 54 Id. (“[P]etitioner ‘expressly aimed’ his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at 
Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a 
‘significant connection’ to Nevada.”) 
 55 Id. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones,56 where a famous entertainer 
successfully prosecuted an action in her home state of California against a 
writer and editor for the nationally circulated publication The National 
Enquirer, which the plaintiff alleged ran a libelous story about her.57 
The unanimous Court had little trouble dispatching the analogy to 
Calder.58  The Court noted that the Calder opinion described California as 
the “focal point” of the story.59  The wide circulation of the publication in 
California, and the fact that the plaintiff’s reputation was centered there, 
rendered the forum state effects in Calder much more substantial than in 
Walden.60  As the Court noted, the Walden case bore some similarities to 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,61 in which the plaintiffs—not the 
defendants—created the relationship to the forum.62  The Court repeated 
several times that the contacts of the plaintiffs with the forum are by 
themselves irrelevant; it is essential that each defendant voluntarily create 
a relationship with the forum state.63 
Although Walden may prove to be the least consequential of the 
opinions, the opinion contains some stray language that might prove 
nettlesome.  In a sentence that defendants are sure to quote frequently 
when attempting to dismiss actions, the Court stated: “[O]ur ‘minimum 
contacts’ analysis looks at the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”64  
Taken out of context, this sentence might seem to announce a rule that 
dealings with forum-state plaintiffs could never suffice and that the 
minimum contacts test requires some additional connection to the forum 
state.  Such a rule, however, could not be squared with cases such as 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz65 and McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co.66 in which the defendant’s sole connection to the forum was 
a contractual relationship with a forum-based plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                                     
 56 465 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 57 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 783). 
 58 Id. at 1125. 
 59 Id. at 1123 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789). 
 60 Id. at 1125. 
 61 Id., at 1123 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). 
 62 Id. (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the 
liberty of the nonresident defendant — not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”). 
 63 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (“A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-
of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant that 
creates the necessary contacts with the forum.”). 
 64 Id. at 1122. 
 65 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 66 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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More likely what the Court was emphasizing was that the 
relationship was formed and the vast majority of their interactions took 
place outside the forum, and the forum became of significance only once 
the plaintiffs returned to Nevada and demanded the money.67  As the Court 
noted, if the plaintiffs’ injury was deprivation of the use of the money, the 
injury could have arisen in any state to which the plaintiffs chose to travel 
and demanded the money.68 
If one squints to see anything else of doctrinal significance, it lies in 
the Court’s footnote leaving to another day the question of the significance 
of virtual contacts.69  The plaintiffs argued that denying them access to a 
Nevada forum could have the unintended consequence of denying a 
reasonable forum to plaintiffs injured over the Internet, perhaps by 
fraudulent schemes or “phishing.”70  As did Justice Breyer’s opinion 
concurring in the judgment in J. McIntyre, the Court expressly left 
“questions about virtual contacts for another day.”71 
The most audacious effort at asserting jurisdiction was the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion that was reversed in Daimler AG v. Bauman.72  In 
Daimler, the plaintiffs were citizens of Argentina who alleged that they or 
close relatives were victims of Argentina’s “Dirty War” that lasted from 
1976 to 1983.73  The corporate defendant was Daimler, the German auto-
manufacturing giant that makes Mercedes-Benz vehicles.74  The plaintiffs 
brought a complaint in a California federal court alleging a variety of tort 
theories claiming that Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary conspired with the 
government to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and their 
relatives . . . .”75 
The plaintiffs’ theory of jurisdiction required several analytical leaps 
ranging from the debatable to the highly implausible.  First, the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                     
 67 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (“Respondents (and only respondents) lacked access to 
their funds in Nevada not because anything independently occurred there, but because 
Nevada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they desired to use the funds 
seized by petitioner.”). 
 68 Id. (“Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in California, 
Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting more 
money than they had.”). 
 69 Id. at 1125 n.9. 
 70 Id. 
 71 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792-93 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (questioning the potential idea of granting jurisdiction against 
a company who instead of shipping product direct, cosigns through an intermediary such 
as Amazon.com). 
 72 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 73 Id. at 751. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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alleged that Daimler was vicariously liable for the actions of its 
Argentinian subsidiary.76  Second, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler’s 
indirect U.S. subsidiary – Mercedes-Benz U.S.A. – had sufficient 
unrelated contacts in California that it would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in California.77  Third, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler 
controlled its subsidiary to a sufficient degree that the subsidiary’s 
contacts could be imputed to Daimler, rendering Daimler subject to 
jurisdiction in California.78  Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that 
Daimler’s contacts on their own sufficed to subject it to jurisdiction in 
California.79  Fourth, the plaintiffs argued that despite the lack of any 
connection between California and the events and the parties, the assertion 
of jurisdiction could survive the Asahi reasonableness test.80 
The District Court dismissed the action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and at first the Ninth Circuit affirmed over the dissent of one 
of the three members of the panel.81  In a remarkable turn of events, 
without additional briefing or argument, the Ninth Circuit panel granted 
plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing and reversed itself with an expanded 
version of the dissent becoming the majority opinion.82  This time, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs’ theory that the contacts of 
Daimler’s U.S. subsidiary could be imputed to it under an “agency” 
theory.83  Daimler’s petition to have the case reheard en banc failed, but 
eight judges dissented from the denial of the rehearing petition and filed a 
                                                                                                                                     
 76 Id. at 752. 
 77 Id. (arguing “[a]lthough [Mercedes-Benz USA’s] principal place of business is in 
New Jersey, [Mercedes-Benz USA] has multiple California-based facilities, including a 
regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center 
in Irvine . . . . [Mercedes-Benz USA] is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the 
California market . . . . Over 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take 
place in California, and [Mercedes-Benz USA] California sales account for 2.4% of 
Daimler’s worldwide sales.”). 
 78 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746 (“plaintiffs maintained that jurisdiction over Daimler 
could be founded on the California contacts of [Mercedes-Benz USA], a distinct corporate 
entity that, according to plaintiffs, should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional 
purposes”). 
 79 Id. (“plaintiffs submitted declarations and exhibits purporting to demonstrate the 
presence of Daimler itself in California”). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 752–53; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Reinhart, J., dissenting). 
 82 134 S. Ct. at 753; Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 83 Bauman, 644 F.3d at 924 (holding that because Mercedes-Benz USA’s services 
were sufficiently important to DaimlerChrysler and DaimlerChrysler had the right to 
control Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities, thus declaring Mercedes-Benz USA was 
DaimlerChrysler’s agent for general jurisdictional purposes). 
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written opinion.84  That dissent argued that the panel’s agency theory was 
so broad that it would render almost every multinational corporation 
subject to jurisdiction in every state.85 
There was little doubt that the plaintiffs would lose in the Supreme 
Court.86  However, the opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by seven other 
Justices, adopted a theory that may roll the boundaries of general 
jurisdiction back past even what one might have expected after the 
announcement of the Goodyear “essentially at home” test.87  The Court 
held Daimler to have conceded that its U.S. subsidiary was subject to 
general jurisdiction in California, though it was careful to make clear the 
U.S. subsidiary might not have been subject to jurisdiction had Daimler 
pressed the point.88  The Court also accepted arguendo the Ninth Circuit 
panel’s contention that the U.S. subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed to 
Daimler.89  But, said the majority, just because the subsidiary is “at home” 
in California doesn’t mean that Daimler the parent is.90 
The majority adopted what Justice Sotomayor—in her solo 
concurrence in the judgment—called a “proportionality” test.91  Despite 
the fairly substantial contacts between the U.S. subsidiary and California 
– multiple offices and extensive vehicle sales92 – when looked at from the 
perspective of Daimler, it could not be at home in California because 
Daimler had vastly more substantial contacts outside of California.93  The 
majority’s rationale baffled Justice Sotomayor.94  How is it, Justice 
Sotomayor wondered, that contacts sufficient to render the smaller 
subsidiary subject to jurisdiction in California become insufficient simply 
because a larger corporation has more contacts elsewhere?95  Justice 
Sotomayor also argued that such a rationale was inconsistent with Perkins, 
                                                                                                                                     
 84 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753. 
 85 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 86 Borchers, supra note 46, at 14. 
 87 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 88 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that Daimler failed to object below to plaintiffs’ 
assertion that the California courts could exercise all-purpose jurisdiction over [Mercedes-
Benz USA], and that the Court has not addressed whether a foreign corporation may be 
subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary). 
 89 Id. at 760. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 92 Id. at 752 (“[Mercedes-Benz USA] has multiple California-based facilities . . . Over 
10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take place in California . . . .”). 
 93 Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The problem the Court says, 
is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, but that its contacts with other 
forums are too many.”). 
 94 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770. 
 95 Id. at 763–64. 
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which upheld jurisdiction while describing the corporation’s contacts with 
the forum state as being “limited.”96  Rather, Justice Sotomayor would 
have decided the case in favor of Daimler based on the Asahi 
reasonableness test because of the foreign parties and events.97 
While Daimler was the most exorbitant attempt at exercising 
jurisdiction, its rationale could well be the most far reaching of the four 
decisions.  While the majority insisted that it was not limiting general 
jurisdiction over corporations to the states of incorporation and principal 
places of business,98 it’s becoming increasingly difficult to believe that the 
Court has not retracted contacts-based general jurisdiction to that point, or 
something close to it.  First, the Court emphasized that it was only 
assuming that the U.S. subsidiary was subject to general jurisdiction in 
California, despite the fact that most lower courts have held that the 
presence of substantial physical offices is enough to subject a corporation 
to general jurisdiction.99  Second, the Court’s proportionality test is clearly 
an effort to ensure that even the largest of corporate defendants are subject 
to jurisdiction in at most a few places.  But, as Justice Sotomayor noted, 
it’s difficult at best to glean from the Court’s opinion when the non-forum 
contacts so overwhelm the forum-state contacts as to make the latter 
insufficient for constitutional purposes. 
II.  THE JURISDICTIONAL WORLD BEFORE INTERNATIONAL SHOE 
The Court begins most jurisdictional opinions these days with a 
recitation of a truncated, mythical history in which the evil Pennoyer 
decision turned the landscape into a petrified forest of rules of very limited 
jurisdictional reach, but then the International Shoe Court heroically 
                                                                                                                                     
 96 Id. at 767–68 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 
438 (1952)). The majority and Justice Sotomayor each devoted several lengthy footnotes 
to arguing about whether Perkins could be fairly read as showing that the defendant 
corporation in that case had substantial activities outside the forum state of Ohio. See, e.g., 
id at 768, n.9; see also id. at 756 n.8. 
 97 Id. at 773 (“I would reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the narrower ground that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over Daimler would be unreasonable in any event.”). The 
majority opinion also put some weight on Daimler’s foreign nationality and credited the 
Solicitor General’s assertion that adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s view would strain 
international relations and make it more difficult for the U.S. to negotiate judgment-
recognition treaties; see also id. at 763. 
 98 Id. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general 
jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; 
it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”). 
 99 See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 411 (5th ed. 2010). 
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smashed through all of this by invention of the minimum contacts test.100  
Reading this recounting, one imagines a pre-International Shoe world of 
hapless plaintiffs left without any realistic judicial recourse unless they 
happened to catch defendants in the forum to serve them.101  The problem 
seemed particularly acute with regard to corporations, as the Court held 
that in-state service of a corporate officer was not by itself sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction.102 
The pre-International Shoe reality was vastly more complicated, 
however.  For one thing, ambiguity persisted well past Pennoyer as to the 
role of the Due Process Clause.  Some courts took what the “expansive 
view” and others the “limited view”103 of the Pennoyer opinion.  The 
expansive view is the familiar one to us today in which the Due Process 
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses work in tandem under a unified standard 
to limit assertions of jurisdiction (the role of the Due Process Clause) while 
requiring the recognition of judgments from other states with a 
constitutionally sufficient jurisdictional basis (the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s role).104 
However, doubt persisted until 1915 as to whether there was a 
unified standard, with some state courts believing that they could enforce 
a judgment against in-state assets even if the assertion of jurisdiction went 
beyond the boundaries set by the U.S. Supreme Court.105  The lack of 
clarity on this point was fueled by Supreme Court opinions involving 
collateral attacks to state court judgments stating that they could be 
                                                                                                                                     
 100 See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011) (referring to International Shoe as “pathmarking”); see also J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). 
 101 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 102 See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); 
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); see Martinez v. Caribbean, No. 12-16043 
2014 U.S. App. Lexis 16163 at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2014) (reaching the result that in-state 
service of a corporate officer does not confer jurisdiction over the corporation, but 
remarkably never cited the Supreme Court’s controlling decisions in Riverside and 
Goldey). 
 103 Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–41. 
 104 Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–39 (“The expansive view of Pennoyer is that the court 
intended for the due process clause to provide both a mechanism for challenging either 
interstate or intrastate, state court assertions of personal jurisdiction, and the contents of 
the jurisdiction rules themselves.”). 
 105 Jester v. Steam Packet Co., 131 N.C. 54 (1902); Pope v. Terre Haute Co., 87 N.Y. 
137 (1881); see also Riverside, 237 U.S. 189 (sustaining a direct attack on a state court 
judgment based on service on corporate officer within the forum on personal business). 
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“questioned in a court of another government,”106 implying that a different 
rule might apply in direct attack cases.107 
But even with that ambiguity resolved in favor of the expansive view 
in 1915 – thus unifying the standards for direct and collateral attacks on 
state-court judgments108—jurisdictional doctrine of the time was not 
nearly as ossified as one might imagine.  In fact, many of the current 
debates taking place within the context of the minimum contacts test bear 
a remarkable resemblance to those in the pre-International Shoe 
jurisdictional world. 
As discussed below, one of the most important extensions of the 
common law bases of jurisdiction, was the notion that corporations “doing 
business” within a state were “present” there and thus could be served with 
process and made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state other 
than their incorporation.109  As we shall see, International Shoe itself was 
a fairly easy case for jurisdiction under the “doing business” test and – 
read in context – its minimum contacts language was an effort to clarify 
and systematize that test as applied to out-of-state corporations.  In fact, it 
was not finally resolved until the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in 
Shaffer v. Heitner110 that the minimum contacts test even applied to 
individual defendants. 
Nor was the “doing business” test the only expansion of jurisdiction 
that took place between Pennoyer and International Shoe.  Statutes 
creating jurisdiction over non-resident motorists involved in accidents 
within the forum state’s borders created what we could call today specific 
jurisdiction.111  Additionally most of the “satellite” bases of jurisdiction 
survived International Shoe and carry over to today, with the notable 
                                                                                                                                     
 106 See Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 
(1907). 
 107 See also Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895) (noting that the New 
York state law rule allowed for jurisdiction over a corporation merely by service on any 
officer of the corporation even if not in the state on corporate business, the Court stated: 
“Whatever effect a constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the same 
government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government.”). 
 108 Riverside, 237 U.S. at 194–95 (“the courts of one state may not without violating 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, render a judgment against a 
corporation organized under the laws of another State where such corporation has not come 
into such State for the purpose of doing business therein . . . ”). 
 109 See infra notes 180–202 and accompanying text. 
 110 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977). 
 111 The term adopted by the Supreme Court for cases in which the claim arises out of 
or relates to forum-state activities.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408 (1984).  The Supreme Court now also calls specific jurisdiction “case-
linked.”  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011). 
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exception of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the attachment of property 
unrelated to the dispute. 
To be sure, that is not to say that nothing has changed post-
International Shoe.  When the jurisdictional reach of courts hit its high-
water mark with the Supreme Court’s decision in McGee v. International 
Life Insurance Co.112 – a decision that held that the sale of a single life 
insurance policy in the forum state created minimum contacts with the 
corporate insurer – it appeared that the Constitution might fade into the 
background as only a loose outer boundary on the power of states, much 
as it did with regard to choice of law.113  The Supreme Court, however, 
almost immediately post-McGee quashed that notion.114  Since then, the 
jurisdictional boundaries permitted under the Constitution have been in 
steady contraction. 
The contraction has now reached the point where it’s worth asking 
whether International Shoe still deserves the emphasis placed on it.  It is 
unlikely that the Court will abandon the minimum contacts language, but 
the question worth asking is whether there really is anything left of the 
minimum contacts test – at least conceived of as a mechanism for 
promoting jurisdictional regime fundamentally guided by fairness.115  
Assuming, as this article posits, that what now exists isn’t very different 
in actual practice from the pre-International Shoe regime, and may be 
more protective of defendants, one might wonder whether this is truly 
progress. 
                                                                                                                                     
 112 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 113 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (affirming the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision to apply Minnesota substantive law to govern the effect of an 
automobile insurance policy even though the accident did not occur in Minnesota, the 
vehicle was not registered in Minnesota, and the plaintiff’s decedent did not live in 
Minnesota). 
 114 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ((“the requirements for personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, to the 
flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. But it is a mistake to assume 
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of 
state courts.”) (citations omitted)). 
 115 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 323–24 (1945) ((“Due Process does permit 
State courts to ‘enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred’ if it be found 
‘reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial 
justice.’ And this in turn means that we will ‘permit’ the State to act if upon an ‘estimate 
of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its 
‘home’ or principal place of business, we conclude that it is ‘reasonable’ to subject it to 
suit in a State where it is doing business.”) (emphasis added)). 
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A. “Satellite” Bases of Jurisdiction 
The United States law of personal jurisdiction has long allowed what 
are sometimes called “satellite” bases of jurisdiction, that is, assertions of 
jurisdiction that do not depend directly on what we now call contacts.116  
There are several, and all but one survived into the post-International Shoe 
world. 
1.  In-State Service 
In-state service of process – sometimes called “transient service” or 
“tag” jurisdiction117—on an individual defendant as a jurisdictional basis 
has a long history in the United States.  State courts inherited the rule from 
the common law and applied it from nearly the birth of the United 
States.118  The Pennoyer decision recognized it as the paradigmatic way in 
which in personam jurisdiction could be obtained over individuals.119 
It was heavily criticized in the post-International Shoe era as being 
unnecessary and potentially unfair to defendants making only a brief visit 
to the forum state.120  The argument ran that while in-state service might 
have been a sensible basis when travel was more difficult, the rule was a 
                                                                                                                                     
 116 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 392; see also Harold S. Lewis, 
Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform 
Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984) (defining “satellite jurisdiction” as decisions 
approving jurisdiction on “‘single factor’ bases such as consent, waiver, domicile, state of 
incorporation, and personal service within the state.”). 
 117 Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of An Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 
75 (1978). 
 118 See, e.g., Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 357–58 (1819) (defendant’s “arrest” in 
the forum state of Massachusetts sufficed to obtain jurisdiction over him in a civil 
partnership dispute, even though the defendant was not a resident of Massachusetts). 
 119 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878) (“Where a party is within a territory, he 
may justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced 
on such process against him. Where he is not within such territory, and is not personally 
subject to its law, if, on account of his supposed or actual property being within the 
territory, process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance, and 
for his default to appear judgment may be pronounced against him, such a judgment must, 
upon general principles, be deemed only to bind him to the extent of such property, and 
cannot have the effect of a conclusive judgment in personam . . . .”) (quoting Picquet v. 
Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828)). 
 120 See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (“Sitting in the lounge of 
his plane on a nonstop flight over New York, a citizen of California is handed a summons. 
For many years to come, to his great expense and greater annoyance, he will have to defend 
a law suit in a New York court three thousand miles away, from his home, even thought 
the plaintiff may be a spiteful competitor alleging a fanciful claim dating back many years 
to a trip abroad.”); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International 
Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 593. 
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holdover from the “power” theory of jurisdiction associated with 
Pennoyer and should give way to the “fairness” era ushered in by 
International Shoe.121  In a famously aggressive use of it, a lower court 
upheld jurisdiction based on service of a defendant on an airplane passing 
through the forum state’s airspace.122  Many commentators predicted the 
in-state service rule would not survive after the Supreme Court expanded 
the minimum contacts test to limit quasi in rem jurisdiction.123 
                                                                                                                                     
 121 Ehrenzweig, supra note 120, at 311–12 (“there seems to be little left of the rule of 
Pennoyer v. Neff save the amorphous formula of fair play and substantial justice well 
known to use from the law of jurisdiction over corporations. It may well be the in the law 
of jurisdiction over individuals, as in that of jurisdiction over foreign corporations, a 
substantial “minimum contact” will ultimately be the touchstone of permissible 
jurisdiction. The question will then arise whether this formula, whose extreme flexibility 
is hardly preferable to the extreme rigidity of the classical rule of physical service, will not 
need to be supplemented by criteria within the civilian laws of competency, or, more likely, 
within the common law of forum non conveniens.”). 
 122 Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
 123 Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of 
In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38, 61 (1979–80) (arguing tag jurisdiction 
cannot survive Shaffer); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. 
REV. 427, 438 (1929) (writing in 1929 Professor Dodd questioned the validity of tag 
jurisdiction:”Not only is there thus reason to doubt the appropriateness in all cases of 
conducting litigation in a state which has no relation to the controversy except the fact that 
the defendant is temporarily present therein, there is also strong ground for arguing that it 
is often highly desirable and altogether appropriate to try a case in a state in which the 
defendant may not be present at all.”); Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Note, Lockert v. Breedlove; 
The North Carolina Supreme Court Rejects the Minimum Contacts Analysis Under the 
“Transient Rule” of Jurisdiction, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1051, 1059–60 (1987) (criticizing North 
Carolina Supreme Court for upholding constitutionality of tag jurisdiction); Ehrenzweig, 
supra note 120 (criticizing fairness of in-state service rule); Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v. 
Heitner: The Supreme Court’s Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY 
L.J. 739, 770 (1977) (stating that “[t]he contacts formula could rarely be satisfied” in cases 
involving tag jurisdiction); Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a Unified Theory of 
Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 474 (1981) (stating that “[w]e 
may assume that the Court will restrict ‘tag’ jurisdiction whenever the occasion presents 
itself”); Lewis, supra note 116, at 61 (stating that “courts should discard the single factor 
jurisdictional basis of ‘tagging’“); Robert Allen Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice 
of Law in Interstate Accident Cases: The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 329, 332 (stating that  “Shaffer presumably renders unconstitutional the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction based solely on personal service in the forum”); Silberman, supra note 
117, at 75 (stating that “if the power theory is rejected altogether [by Shaffer] . . . then the 
traditional basis of physical ‘tag’ for serving a defendant within a state . . . would be 
constitutionally suspect”); David H. Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary 
Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997, 1021 (1978) (stating 
that availability of transient jurisdiction is “open to substantial doubt”); David H. Vernon, 
Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 303 (availability of transient jurisdiction “doubtful”); 
Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State 
Courts: Time For Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 492 (1984) (“[t]he traditional basis for 
personal jurisdiction that is most vulnerable [after Shaffer] is service on the defendant while 
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In 1990 however, in Burnham v. Superior Court,124 the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the in-state service rule, though under 
a splintered rationale.  The four-Justice plurality argued that the rule’s 
acceptance at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
sufficed to establish its constitutionality.125  Four Justices concurring in the 
judgment argued that the rule’s historical pedigree could not suffice to 
demonstrate its constitutionality, but argued that the rule was fair in 
operation even for brief visits, such as the Burnham defendant’s three-day 
visit to the forum state of California.126  Justice Stevens wrote a brief 
concurrence agreeing with both rationales.127 
2.  Domicile 
Before International Shoe, the domicile of an individual defendant 
was usually held to be a basis for in personam jurisdiction.  State courts 
generally so held that as long as there was reasonable notice to the 
defendant, either by personally serving him outside the forum state or 
leaving the summons and complaint at his usual place of abode within the 
forum state.128  The Supreme Court strongly hinted in McDonald v. 
Mabee129 that domicile was a constitutionally sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction, but there sustained the attack on the judgment there because 
notice by publication in a newspaper was inadequate.130  In Blackmer v. 
                                                                                                                                     
he is transiently present in the forum”).  But see Willis L.M. Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner; 
Implications for the Doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1978) (stating 
that “it is by no means clear that Shaffer v. Heitner declares tag jurisdiction 
unconstitutional”); Eric P. Heichel, Note, The Physical Presence Basis of Personal 
Jurisdiction Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner; A Rule in Search of a Rationale, 62 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 713, 730 (1987) (arguing that tag jurisdiction serves goal of providing 
plaintiff with a forum). 
 124 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 125 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622  (“[A] doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates back to 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed unquestionably 
meets [the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice] standard.”). 
 126 Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 127 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 128 Hurlburt v. Thomas, 10 A. 556 (Conn. 1887) (abode service); Henderson v. 
Staniford, 105 Mass. 504 (1870) (collecting cases allowing domicile as a basis for 
jurisdiction); In re Hendrickson, 167 N.W. 172 (S.D. 1918) (personal service outside the 
forum); Fernandez v. Casey, 14 S.W. 149 (Tex. 1890).  Not all courts took this view, 
however.  The Iowa Supreme Court in Raher v. Raher, 129 N.W. 494 (Iowa 1911) took the 
view that service outside the forum state on a domiciliary did not confer in personam 
jurisdiction.  The majority opinion purported to be unable to find any cases from other 
states on the question, though there clearly were, as pointed out by the dissent.  The Iowa 
Supreme Court overruled Raher in Edwards v. Smith, 29 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1947). 
 129 243 U.S. 90 (1917). 
 130 Id. at 92. 
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United States,131 the Court upheld under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment the power of the federal government to punish by 
contempt an American who refused to respond to a subpoena, even though 
he was not served in the United States.  Reasoning by analogy, domicile 
is to a state what citizenship is to a nation.  The Supreme Court finally 
closed the loop in Milliken v. Meyer,132 holding that Wyoming had 
jurisdiction over one of its domiciliaries even though he was served in 
Colorado. 
Domicile continues on as an essentially unchallenged basis for in 
personam jurisdiction.133  Interestingly, although referring to the need to 
give the domiciliary reasonable notice, the Milliken Court coined the 
phrase “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”134 that the 
International Shoe Court would quote five years later in formulating the 
minimum contacts test.135  The conversion of jurisdiction from a “power” 
or “sovereignty” theory to one of fairness was not instantaneous with the 
rendering of the International Shoe opinion, nor has it been complete—as 
the periodic reemergence of the sovereignty strand in modern opinions 
shows.136  So when Justice Holmes in 1917 penned his famous line that 
“[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power” he immediately 
qualified it by stating that even under the common law’s “conception of 
sovereignty” it “required a judgment not to be contrary to natural justice” 
and with jurisdictional fictions “great caution should be used not to let 
fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close 
adhesion to fact.”137 
3. Voluntary Appearance and Express Consent 
Courts at common law and continuing to today treat the right to 
object to personal jurisdiction as waivable.  Voluntary appearance without 
a timely objection to jurisdiction has long been accepted as a form of 
                                                                                                                                     
 131 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
 132 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
 133 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 398. But see RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 209 (5th ed. 2006) (basing 
jurisdiction purely on a technical domicile raises fairness questions). 
 134 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
 135 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 136 See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (“The [Due Process] Clause ‘protect[s] 
a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance 
with the valid laws of the land’. This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign 
to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign 
to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”). 
 137 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
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express consent to jurisdiction.138  In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,139 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
principle that a party may, through conduct, forfeit its right to object to 
personal jurisdiction.  Thus, with regard to voluntary appearance as a basis 
for jurisdiction, little has changed, except for an evolution from older 
pleading regimes that required a strict “special appearance” to the Federal 
Rules model that requires jurisdiction to be raised early in the case, but 
strictly as the sole issue that the defendant raises at the case’s outset.140 
4.  Personal Status 
Another satellite basis for jurisdiction is the domicile of any person 
whose “personal status” is being changed.  This gives courts divorce 
jurisdiction to a state in which either party is domiciled141 or to give 
jurisdiction to a court in which other status matters such as custody and 
competence are being decided.142  The Pennoyer majority opinion 
explicitly left status determinations untouched.143 The status basis 
survived the transition to the minimum contacts era unscathed.144 
5.  Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
The satellite basis of jurisdiction the minimum contacts regime 
undeniably alters is quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the attachment of 
property of the defendant unrelated to the litigation.  This has been referred 
to as the “quasi in rem hold-up.”145  In rem jurisdiction literally involves 
jurisdiction over property, and thus any judgment only can affect rights in 
the property.146  In cases in which the dispute directly involves the property 
                                                                                                                                     
 138 See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (filing of a counterclaim amounted 
to a submission to the court’s jurisdiction); Sugg v. Thorton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889) (finding 
that failure to raise a jurisdictional objection by special appearance amounted to a waiver 
of jurisdictional objections). 
 139 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (noting failure to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h) (personal jurisdiction objections waived if not timely raised). 
 140 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 401. 
 141 See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). 
 142 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 353. 
 143 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1878) (“To prevent any misapplication of the 
views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by 
any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the Status 
of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, 
though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident.”). 
 144 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 
(1948). 
 145 Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993). 
 146 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 350. 
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– a contest over a decedent’s estate, for instance – it makes perfect sense 
to vest jurisdiction in the courts of the state where the property is 
located.147 
Far more problematic were quasi in rem cases in which the property 
itself was not the subject of any dispute, but rather the presence of the 
property was simply an excuse to proceed with what was for practical 
purposes an in personam action in the state in which the defendant 
happened to own property.  In fact, Pennoyer was just that sort of case, but 
jurisdiction was defeated because the plaintiff failed to attach the property 
at the outset of the case.148  Quasi in rem jurisdiction created the possibility 
of default judgments taking the property of out-of-state landholders 
without any actual notice of the action and no realistic way to mount a 
defense.  The lack of notice stemmed from the fiction that the property 
was “always in the possession of its owner” so that seizure of it would 
automatically convey notice.149  Often, procedural statutes required only 
likely futile efforts at notice, such as by publication of a copy of the 
summons in a local newspaper.150 
The possibilities for abuse grew as the use of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction expanded from real to intangible property.  The most notorious 
example was Harris v. Balk, in which a debt owed to a creditor was held 
to be property of the creditor and located wherever the debtor went, 
allowing the debt to be “attached” by seizing the body of the debtor.151  In 
Shaffer v. Heitner,152 the Supreme Court tore down the fiction by holding 
that these sorts of quasi in rem cases were nothing more than in personam 
actions against the owner of the property.153  The Court therefore held that 
the true defendant, the property owner, could be subject to jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                                                     
 147 Id. 
 148 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
 149 Id. at 727 (“The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, 
in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not 
only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings 
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.”). 
 150 See, e.g., id. at 721 (“The majority of the court are also of opinion that the provision 
of the statute requiring proof of the publication in a newspaper to be made by the ‘affidavit 
of the printer, or his foreman, or his principal clerk,’ is satisfied when the affidavit is made 
by the editor of the paper.”); Webster v. Reid, 1 Morris 467 (Iowa 1846) (affirming a lower 
court’s decision with regards to the validity of an Iowa statute allowing for notice in a local 
publication, in this case eight weeks notice of action against a land owner through 
publication in the “Iowa Teritorial [sic] Gazette”); Brown v. Woods’ & Crump’s Heirs, 29 
Ky. 11, 15 (1831) (“the acts of Assembly tolerating proceedings against absent defendants 
and unknown heirs, upon constructive notice by publication, must be strictly observed.”). 
 151 198 U.S. 215, 222–23 (1905). 
 152 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 153 Id. at 212. 
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the forum state only if he had minimum contacts with it.154  The practical 
effect of Shaffer was to collapse quasi in rem jurisdiction into in personam 
jurisdiction, because if the property owner has minimum contacts with the 
forum, he is subject to in personam jurisdiction, which has the advantage 
that the judgment is not limited to the property.155 
International Shoe is often thought to have liberalized state-court 
jurisdiction.156  But at least with satellite bases of jurisdiction, the 
minimum contacts era effected only one significant change, and that was 
to contract state-court jurisdiction by essentially eliminating quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. 
B. Jurisdiction in Tort Actions 
Jurisdiction in tort actions is a bit harder to gauge because substantive 
tort law has changed greatly since the pre-International Shoe era and 
technological innovations have made multistate torts easier to commit.  Of 
the tort jurisdictional cases decided in the minimum contacts era, four have 
been product liability cases (all holding that there was no jurisdiction),157 
two were libel actions based on statements made in nationally circulated 
publications (both concluding that there was jurisdiction),158 one was a 
negligence case in which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to assert 
jurisdiction based on unrelated contacts,159 one pled a potpourri of tort 
theories but jurisdiction was unsuccessfully asserted based on unrelated 
contacts,160 and one was a constitutional tort case—akin to conversion or 
trespass to chattels—in which the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
home state did not have jurisdiction because the tortious conduct took 
place elsewhere.161 
                                                                                                                                     
 154 Id. (“all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the 
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”). 
 155 HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 99, at 353. 
 156 See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 157 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857; J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2791; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). 
 158 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783 (1983). 
 159 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). 
 160 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014). 
 161 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2014).  The Supreme Court also decided 
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). But there the attempted exercise of jurisdiction was 
based on a quasi in rem theory, which the Court rejected as being barred by Shaffer’s 
requirement that the true defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state. 
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In many of these cases, no pre-International Shoe analog exists.  
Product liability theory was is in its infancy when International Shoe was 
decided.  In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,162 Judge Cardozo writing for 
New York’s high court dispensed with the “privity” requirement and 
allowed a consumer to sue a manufacturer for a negligently designed or 
manufactured product.163  However, modern product liability law was not 
born until the California Supreme Court’s decision in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products164—decided eighteen years after International Shoe – 
allowed plaintiffs to proceed on a strict liability theory.  Multistate 
defamation was not unknown in the pre-International Shoe days, but the 
technological capacity to distribute publications nationally was not as 
readily available as it is today, to say nothing of the Internet’s ability to 
spread a message worldwide with a few keystrokes on a computer.165  As 
automobiles became the prevalent means of transportation, the likelihood 
of residents of different states being involved in negligence actions 
increased dramatically, but the pre-International Shoe Supreme Court 
handled this issue sensibly by upholding the constitutionality of 
nonresident motorist statutes.166 
In the well-known case of Hess v. Pawloski,167 the defendant was a 
Pennsylvania motorist who, while driving in Massachusetts, collided with 
a Massachusetts motorist.168  The Massachusetts motorist brought suit in 
his home state against the other driver and asserted jurisdiction under a 
Massachusetts statute providing that nonresident motorists driving on 
Massachusetts roads were deemed to have appointed the Massachusetts 
Secretary of State as their agent for service of process.169  The statute 
required the plaintiff to serve the Secretary and pay a fee and the Secretary 
was then in turn required to send a copy of the summons to the nonresident 
defendant by registered mail.170  The scheme paid homage to Pennoyer’s 
territorialism by requiring a physical act of service of process to take place 
within the forum state, but for practical purposes it was service by mail.171  
Although modern long-arm statutes allow for service outside the state 
                                                                                                                                     
 162 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 163 Id. at 1157. 
 164 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 165 See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Young v. New Haven 
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Griffs v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). 
 166 See Hess v. Pawloski 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
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 168 Id. at 353. 
 169 Id. at 354. 
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 171 Id. at 355 (“The process of a court of one State cannot run into another and summon 
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(often by registered mail) without the need to serve a constructive agent of 
the defendant,172 it is still common for states to require foreign 
corporations to appoint an in-state agent to accept process as a condition 
of doing in-state business, and if they fail to do so to be deemed to have 
appointed a state official as their agent.173 
The U.S. Supreme Court sensibly upheld the Massachusetts 
statute.174  Foreshadowing International Shoe’s fairness language, the 
Court pointed to the relative position of the parties; “The measure in 
question operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the 
state where arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as to provide 
for a claimant a convenient method by which he may sue to enforce his 
rights.”175  Although the Court resorted to the dubious fiction of “implied 
consent” of the nonresident motorist to sustain the statute,176 the rationale 
has a modern feel; in fact it is an improvement over the rationales offered 
up in the most recent cases. 
Although this article does not quarrel with the result in the much 
more recent Walden decision, the Court’s strenuous efforts there to banish 
from the jurisdictional calculus any consideration of the plaintiff’s interest 
in obtaining a convenient forum were quite stunning.177  As it has been 
noted,178 the practical effect of the J. McIntyre decision was to deprive a 
U.S. plaintiff of any realistic forum in the name of giving a foreign 
manufacturer jurisdictional protection that it would not receive in its own 
nation’s courts.179  The Hess Court’s recognition of the need of the plaintiff 
to have a reasonable forum is a veritable breath of fresh air contrasted with 
the exclusive defendant focus of those modern decisions. 
Negligence involving railroads also presented the possibility of 
multistate tort actions. One example is Simon v. Southern Railway Co.180  
                                                                                                                                     
 172 See, e.g. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(3) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT.  § 634–35(b) (2002); 735 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.510.130 (2011). 
 173 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–59(B)(c) (1971); IOWA CODE § 617.3 (2003); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 4:4–4(A)(6) (West 2003). 
 174 Hess, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (“Due process limits on the State’s 
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the 
convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”). 
 178 Borchers, supra note 46, at 12; J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the 
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 18, at 1246; Yeargan, supra note 
18. 
 179 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a disadvantage in 
comparison to similarly situated complainant elsewhere in the world.”). 
 180 236 U.S. 115 (1915). 
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In that case, defendant’s railroad in Alabama allegedly injured the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff attempted to assert jurisdiction in the Louisiana 
courts on the grounds that the defendant was doing business in the forum 
state.181  Turning away the plaintiff’s efforts to enforce a judgment against 
the railroad, the Court presaged what today would be called the division 
between specific and general jurisdiction.  The Court reasoned that the 
question of whether an employee of the railroad could be treated as an 
agent for service of process, the Court stated that this question depends on 
how the claim “relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction 
of the state enacting the [service of process] law.”182  Shortly thereafter, 
the Court reasoned: “the statutory consent of a foreign corporation to be 
sued does not extend to causes of action arising in other states.”183 
In modern parlance, the lack of related forum contacts defeated any 
claim to specific jurisdiction, and the foreign corporation (and thus 
presumably not “at home” as the Court has recently defined that phrase) 
doomed any attempt to assert general jurisdiction.184  Again to use modern 
terminology, the Court was worried that merely conducting unrelated 
business could subject the railroad to forum shopping.  If doing unrelated 
business in the forum state sufficed, it would require the defendant to 
defend “claims on contracts wherever made and suits for torts wherever 
committed . . . .”185  The clear implication of the Court’s rationale was that 
it would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed in the injury state of 
Alabama.186 
Defamation cases occasionally arose between citizens of different 
states.  In Goldey v. Morning News,187 a New York plaintiff brought in 
New York an action against corporation publishing The Morning News of 
New Haven, which was described in the Court’s syllabus as “carrying on 
business in [Connecticut] only.”188  Tellingly, the plaintiff only attempted 
to justify jurisdiction under New York’s “Pope”189 rule which allowed for 
in personam jurisdiction over a corporate defendant based merely on 
service of process on a corporate officer while in the state, even if only 
                                                                                                                                     
 181 Id. at 128–29. 
 182 Id. at 130. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. See generally St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913) 
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briefly and for reasons unrelated to corporate business.  The Court ruled 
that the lower court did not have jurisdiction.190 
While tort cases did not make up a large portion of the pre-
International Shoe Supreme Court opinions dealing with jurisdictional 
questions, the Court’s handling of them was sensible.  In fact, the Court 
appeared to have created a jurisdictional equivalent of the lex loci delicti 
– meaning the law of the place of injury191—rule in choice of law, which 
was to give jurisdiction to the plaintiff in the place of the injury.  While it 
is impossible to know whether the Court would have stuck to this rule had 
it retained its pre-International Shoe jurisprudence, such a rule would have 
given the plaintiffs jurisdiction in their chosen forums in World-Wide 
Volkswagen and J. McIntyre, two of the most controversial, and deeply 
divided, opinions of the minimum contacts era.  A place-of-the-injury rule 
would also accord with the European Union’s rule, which – as the dissent 
noted – would have applied to the J. McIntyre defendant had the case been 
brought in an E.U. court.192 
C. “Doing Business” Jurisdiction 
The most important, yet tangled, pre-International Shoe basis was 
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations “doing business” in the state.  
Jurisdiction was rationalized in various ways.  Sometimes the Court said 
that a corporation doing business in the forum state manifested a 
“presence” there (akin to an individual being present in the forum state and 
thus being capable of being served with process).193  Other times, the Court 
reasoned that the corporation had implicitly consented to jurisdiction 
because a state could bar foreign corporations and thus extract from them 
an appointment of an in-state agent for service of process as a condition of 
doing business.194 
While the “doing business” decisions of the pre-International Shoe 
Court turned on fine distinctions, the opinions usually reached fair results.  
Indeed they are notable for their express invocation of the importance of 
                                                                                                                                     
 190 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 525 (1895). 
 191 See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 807 (Ala. 1892). 
 192 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
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the plaintiff having at least one relatively convenient forum in which to 
sue the defendant.  For example, in an opinion involving a policyholder 
suing an out-of-state insurer, the Court in sustaining jurisdiction in the 
policyholder’s home state said that the forum state’s “interest may be 
measured by highly realistic considerations such as the protection of the 
citizen insured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss.”195  
Such reasoning is a marked contrast from the current Court’s rigid 
insistence in J. McIntyre and Walden that the plaintiff is irrelevant to the 
jurisdictional calculus. 
Within the “doing business” opinions there existed a clearly defined 
line between what today we call specific and general jurisdiction.196  
Corporations were held to be “doing business” only if the cause of action 
arose in the forum state.197  In cases in which a corporate defendant only 
did unrelated business, the corporation was not subject to jurisdiction.198 
These pre-International Shoe decisions anticipated the current doctrine 
that a corporation’s contacts must be so weighty as to make it “at home” 
in the forum to subject it to general jurisdiction.199  Unchallenged was the 
right of a plaintiff to sue a corporation in its state of incorporation, but to 
sue it anywhere else required related contacts.200 
The pre-International Shoe decisions were not perfect and presented 
some difficult issues of predictability.  A thorny issue was the line between 
“mere solicitation” and solicitation plus other activities.201  In cases in 
which a corporation engaged in more than mere solicitation, the Court held 
it subject to jurisdiction.202  In cases in which there was no more than that, 
the corporation was not subject to jurisdiction.203  As the Court put it; 
“Each case depends on its own facts.”204 
                                                                                                                                     
 195 Hoopeston, 318 U.S. at 316. 
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Set in this context, International Shoe looks less like a radical break 
from its immediate past than an effort to make sense out of the “doing 
business” cases.  Against this backdrop, the International Shoe result 
finding jurisdiction appears consistent with then-existing law.  Although 
the defendant shoe corporation tried to bring itself within the “mere 
solicitation” rule and avoid jurisdiction, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held that its roughly one dozen salesmen working throughout the state of 
Washington was a sufficient connection with the forum state.205  The 
Washington Supreme Court had reached the same conclusion.206 
The International Shoe Court seemed to have several goals.  One was 
to bring the “presence” and “consent” fictions under one roof.207  Another 
was to put to rest the distinction between ‘mere solicitation and ‘more than 
mere solicitation,’208 a distinction that closely resembles the ongoing split 
between the “resale” and the “resale plus” tests in the Supreme Court’s 
stream-of-commerce jurisprudence.209  Next, the Court made explicit what 
had emerged in the earlier “doing business” cases, which was that 
plaintiffs whose claims arose out of the corporation’s forum-state 
activities stood in a much stronger position than those making claims 
based on unrelated activities.210  Finally, by quoting Milliken’s “fair play 
and substantial justice” language, and adopting Judge Learned Hand’s test 
of an “estimate of the inconveniences,”211 the Court made basic fairness 
the guiding light of constitutional limitations on state-court jurisdiction. 
It is far from clear that the International Shoe Court meant to offer a 
grand unifying theory of judicial jurisdiction.  International Shoe tied 
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 210 Int’l Shoe, 154 P.2d at 820 (holding that the corporations operations within the state 
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 211 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17. 
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together the various strands of the “doing business” test as applied to 
corporate defendants.  But whether the Court did much beyond that is 
uncertain.  In the next Supreme Court case to present a jurisdictional issue, 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,212 the Court did not mention the 
minimum contacts test.  It was not until twelve years after International 
Shoe that the Court expressly mentioned the minimum contacts test. 
It did so in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,213 but in a factual 
context that marked so many of the “doing business” cases—a 
policyholder suing an out-of-state insurance company to make good on a 
claim.214  In retrospect, McGee is remarkable for its solicitude of the 
plaintiff-policyholder by noting that failing to give her a home-state forum 
would likely make litigation against the defendant impracticable,215 but the 
need to give the plaintiff at least one realistic forum was one of the 
important threads that the Supreme Court had tied together in the 
International Shoe opinion. 
From this high water mark for the fairness rationale, the water has 
receded.  And the water has receded to a level that looks remarkably like 
the pre-International Shoe shoreline, or perhaps sits a bit below it. 
III.  A MODEST PROPOSAL 
In his 1980 dissent from World-Wide and its companion case,216 
Justice Brennan wrote that the minimum contacts decisions “may already 
be obsolete as constitutional boundaries.”217  Justice Brennan argued that 
the exclusive focus on defendant contacts, without any exploration of any 
actual inconvenience to the defendant and the need of plaintiff to have 
access to a forum, undercut the International Shoe rationale of fairness and 
                                                                                                                                     
 212 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 213 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 214 Id. (“Lowell Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy 
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reasonableness.218  The point of determining whether there are contacts 
between the defendant and the forum is not a valuable exercise on its own, 
but rather a proxy for fairness to the defendant.  But by any rational 
calculus courts must evaluate fairness to the plaintiff, in particular when 
the plaintiff chooses to sue at home or at the situs of the injury and thus is 
not engaging in any obvious forum shopping.219  Recently, however, the 
Court has evaluated contacts as if they are important for their own sake, 
while denying the relevance of other considerations.220  While Brennan 
was a voice in the wilderness in 1980, his warning that a pure defendant 
focus would distort the basic fairness rationale of International Shoe 
proved prophetic. 
It is unlikely that the Court will abandon the minimum contacts 
language in the foreseeable future.  However, as we have seen, the 
minimum contacts test as currently applied is at best a trivial improvement 
over the regime of the fictions of “implied consent” and “presence” that 
pre-dated International Shoe, and in some ways less flexible.221  As 
applied, the minimum contacts test defies predictability to the point that 
the Court often cannot generate a majority opinion.222  Moreover, the Court 
has vacillated as to the theoretical underpinnings of the test, such as 
whether state sovereignty is an independent factor – all the while siding 
with defendants against plaintiffs who clearly were not forum shopping.223 
The problem stems from the fact that jurisdictional due process is a 
constitutional orphan.224  The minimum contacts test is not an application 
of substantive due process or the Court presumably would apply some 
variant of the rationality test.225  Jurisdictional due process more resembles 
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procedural due process; however, that branch of due process jurisprudence 
divides into the requirements of “fair procedure”226 and “fair notice.”227 
Jurisdictional due process could be wrapped in with those strands of 
due process jurisprudence if the minimum contacts test were replaced with 
– or at least subordinated to – the Asahi balancing test or something like 
it.228  However, in the four most recent minimum contacts opinions, the 
Asahi balancing test was mentioned only in Justice Sotomayor’s lonely 
concurrence in the judgment in Daimler,229 leaving in doubt whether the 
Court will continue to apply the Asahi test, and making it more unlikely 
still that it will supplant minimum contacts as the primary determinant. 
The grudging reasoning and results in the specific jurisdiction cases 
would be less problematic but for the Court’s determination to rein in 
general jurisdiction to the point that defendants are subject to contacts-
based general jurisdiction in only one – or at most a very few – forums.  
Nothing could have made this clearer than resting Daimler on the rationale 
that fulfillment of the test for general jurisdiction depends not only on the 
substantiality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, but also their 
proportionality to contacts in other states.230  As a policy choice, this may 
well be a sensible one.  Opening up large-scale enterprises to jurisdiction 
in all fifty states promotes forum shopping.231  But contracting general 
jurisdiction while leaving plaintiffs who are injured in, and sue in, their 
home states’ courts with no access to a realistic forum is both bizarre and 
unfair.232 
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‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.’”) 
 229 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 230 Id. at 760. 
 231 See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (employing the federal venue 
transfer statute to shop for a forum against a national manufacturer of farm equipment). 
 232 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2801–02 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Courts, both state and federal, confronting facts similar to those here, have 
rightly rejected the conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products across the USA may 
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The difficulty is that the Court continues to attempt to make policy 
judgments better handled by legislation than episodic bursts of confusing 
jurisdictional opinions.  Some commentators have praised the Court’s 
campaign to limit assertions of contacts-based general jurisdiction.233  As 
a policy matter, plaintiffs ought not to have a virtually unlimited menu of 
forum choices.  But the Court’s efforts to decide, through constitutional 
litigation, what is on the menu is a failed project thus far.  If the Court 
cannot produce majority opinions in common circumstances such as 
product suits in which the injury-causing product is sold in the forum, it is 
a tall order to ask lawyers and lower courts to predict results. 
A plaintiff with a cause of action under state law has a property right 
subject to protection under the Due Process Clause.234  In the J. McIntyre 
case, the plaintiff’s property right was summarily extinguished in the name 
of protecting a foreign defendant from the perceived unfairness of having 
to defend in New Jersey.235  In World-Wide, the plaintiffs were prohibited 
from pursuing all of the defendants in Oklahoma – the situs of the accident 
– even though the majority admitted that the forum state might well be the 
most convenient forum for all concerned.236  In Shaffer v. Heitner,237 the 
plaintiff was prohibited from pursuing a shareholders’ derivative action in 
Delaware, even though the corporation was there incorporated.238  Yet in 
                                                                                                                                     
evade jurisdiction in any and all States, including the State where its defective product is 
distributed and causes injury. They have held, instead, that it would undermine principles 
of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court 
at the place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products caused injury.”); 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 
supra note 18, at 1246; Adam M. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three 
Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 505–06 (2012); 
see also Borchers, supra note 18, at 1111–14 (noting fairness concerns raised by J. 
McIntyre decision and suggesting that the Court adopt a doctrine of “nonspecific 
purposeful availment” in which intentional efforts to serve the U.S. market would suffice 
without a need to show targeting of any particular state). 
 233 See e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE 
FOREST. L. REV. 999, 1081 (2012); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction 
After Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549, 572–73 (2012). 
 234 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in 
action is a constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the 
plaintiffs.”). 
 235 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800–01. 
 236 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (“Even if 
the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate 
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in 
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location 
for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”). 
 237 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 238 Id. 
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Keeton v. Hustler,239 the Court tolerated blatant forum shopping as the 
plaintiff was allowed to pursue a libel suit against a national publication 
in New Hampshire, a state with which she had no apparent connection 
because it was the only state in which the statute of limitations had not yet 
expired.240 
These are symptoms that show that the minimum contacts test is very 
ill, perhaps terminally so.  It produces helter-skelter results.  The Court 
vacillates on the theoretical justification for limiting jurisdiction.  The 
Court often decides cases without a majority opinion.  As it is now 
functioning, the minimum contacts test is little or no improvement over 
the “patchwork of legal and factual fictions”241 from which it supposedly 
liberated civil actions. 
I have made sweeping proposals in the past.  In 1990, I suggested 
that the Supreme Court get out of the business of attempting to regulate 
state-court jurisdiction.242  I argued that the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause was implicated only if the defendant’s opportunity to defend the 
case was meaningfully compromised.243  In the case that the subject of my 
attention then – Burnham v. Superior Court 244 – I noted that the question 
at stake was whether the property aspect of the divorce case there would 
be litigated in the husband’s home state of New Jersey or the wife’s home 
state of California.245  Either way, one party was going to be 
inconvenienced, and I could see no constitutional justification for 
preferring one party to the other.246 
                                                                                                                                     
 239 465 U.S. 770, 773 (1984). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219–20 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
((“I join Parts I-III of the Court’s opinion. I fully agree that the minimum-contacts analysis 
developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, represents a far more sensible 
construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual 
fictions that has been generated from the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff. It is precisely 
because the inquiry into minimum contacts is now of such overriding importance . . . ”) 
(citations omitted)). 
 242 Borchers, supra note 7, at 103. 
 243 Borchers, supra note 7,at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a defendant is 
put to the test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically rational for the defendant 
to make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This much, however, should 
be clear: if there are such cases, they are few and far between. Such a motion should require 
a defendant to show a practical inability to defend. Beyond that, a defendant must show 
the availability of some other forum in which the plaintiff can meaningfully pursue the 
claim. Unless the defendant can make that additional showing, dismissal is nothing more 
than trading one constitutional deprivation for another.) 
 244 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 245 Borchers, supra note 7, at 97–98. 
 246 Id. at 99. 
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I still believe this to be the best solution.  By dramatically pulling 
back the boundaries of constitutional regulation of jurisdiction, states 
would be forced to draft meaningful long arm statutes.247  Statutes in 
general do a better job of promoting predictability.  In the related area of 
choice of law, when Louisiana switched from judicially created “interest 
analysis” to statutory choice-of-law rules the affirmance rate of lower 
courts (a reasonably proxy for predictability) increased dramatically.248  
The problem is that Supreme Court abandonment of the field is not likely 
to happen.  The last Justice to call for rejection of the minimum contacts 
test was Justice Brennan in his 1980 dissent in World-Wide.249 
A more modest suggestion was to unite jurisdictional due process 
with procedural due process by adopting the Mathews v. Eldridge250 
balancing test for jurisdictional due process.251  Mathews requires courts 
to evaluate the constitutional need for more elaborate procedures – such 
as live testimony – by balancing the cost of the additional procedure, the 
private party’s interest in the matter and the degree to which the additional 
procedure will contribute to an accurate result.252  The Asahi 
reasonableness test is the Mathews test in different clothing.253  Either the 
                                                                                                                                     
 247 Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473 (2004). 
 248 Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana’s Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical 
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictibility, 60 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000) 
(noting that in pre-codification cases the affirmance rate was 52.9%, but for post-
codification decisions, the affirmance rate improved to 76.2%). 
 249 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“Because I believe that the Court reads International Shoe and its progeny 
too narrowly, and because I believe that the standards enunciated by those cases may 
already be obsolete as constitutional boundaries, I dissent.”). 
 250 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 347–48 (“In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be 
assessed is the public interest. This includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an 
evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits . . . . Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due 
process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision.  
But the Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and 
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an 
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society 
in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost . . . .  
The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, 
judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”). 
 253 Borchers, supra note 224, at 349 ((“This reasonableness test involves the weighing 
of five factors, which are ‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
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reasonableness test could replace the minimum contacts test or it could 
become the primary test, with minimum contacts acting only as a safety 
valve, as opposed to vice versa.254 
This proposal faces long odds now.  Since the Court unveiled the 
Asahi reasonableness test in 1987, the only opinion applying it has been 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the judgment in Daimler.255  Every 
other opinion in the four most recent cases ignored it.  Thus, far from 
appearing poised to supplant the minimum contacts test, the Asahi test may 
well no longer exist. 
This Article advances an even-more-modest proposal; In specific 
jurisdiction cases in which the liability-creating events take place in the 
United States, the plaintiff should be given at least one reasonable forum.  
To understand how modest this proposal is, it appeared to be the law both 
before the creation of the minimum contacts test and for a good while after.  
In McGee, the Court expressly invoked the consideration that if unable to 
sue the insurer at home, the policyholder might be left without any 
practical redress.256  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,257 the Court stated 
that the plaintiff’s need for a forum might allow for an assertion of 
jurisdiction on a lesser showing of purposeful contacts that ordinarily 
needed.  In the pre-International Shoe days, the Court was not shy about 
                                                                                                                                     
substantive social policies.’ This test is the Mathews test recast for the issue of the choice 
of a state forum.  The elements of the test that include the burden on the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s interest are essentially the costs to those parties of various forum choices. If the 
parties differ as to the appropriate forum, then these factors should point toward the forum 
that is the least burdensome in the aggregate to all of the parties.  This is essentially the 
Mathews test’s required balancing of the cost of providing an additional procedure against 
the value of the claimant’s interest.”) (footnote omitted)). 
 254 Borchers, supra note 224, at 352 (“The Court could thus substantially unify 
procedural due process either by abandoning the minimum contacts test in favor of the 
five-factor reasonableness test or, perhaps, subordinating the minimum contacts 
requirement to the reasonableness test. Under current doctrine, the minimum contacts test 
is the primary one with reasonableness acting as a secondary check. If the Court reversed 
the priority of the two, it would go a good distance toward completing the much-needed 
unification of procedural due process”). 
 255 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (holding that she would decide Daimler under the reasonableness test 
because “[t]he same considerations resolve this case.”). 
 256 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“It cannot be denied that 
California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents 
when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage 
if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it 
legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently 
could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in effect making 
the company judgment proof.”). 
 257 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 
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invoking the need for insurance policyholders258 and resident motorists259 
to have access to a home forum. 
This “highly realistic” factor – as the Court has referred to it260—was 
present in International Shoe’s rationale.261  But of late, the J. McIntyre 
plurality attempted to mutate the contacts test into an inquiry into a state’s 
sovereign authority.262  More recently, in Walden, the Court found the 
plaintiffs’ interests to be inconsequential and – confusingly – wrote that 
defendants’ contacts with forum-resident persons are irrelevant.263 
The silver lining is that the Court still has room to take into account 
the plaintiff’s need for at least one reasonable forum.  The J. McIntyre 
plurality opinion is not controlling; the two-vote concurrence in the 
judgment is.264  Because the concurrence did not adopt the sovereignty 
dogma of the plurality, it is not binding on lower courts.  In Walden, much 
of the troublesome language is dictum.  The plaintiffs there surely could 
have sued in Georgia where the money was seized.265  There was no 
compelling need there to give the plaintiffs a jurisdictional bonus and 
allow them to sue at home in Nevada simply on the hypothesis that the 
defendant knew they lived there.266  Moreover, in jurisdictional opinions 
the Court has shown a remarkable facility for tiptoeing away from ill-
considered language.  The most obvious example was after having written 
in World-Wide that the needs of interstate federalism could defeat the 
plaintiff’s forum choice even if it proved to be the most convenient,267 two 
                                                                                                                                     
 258 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943). 
 259 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 260 Hoopeston, 318 U.S. at 316. 
 261 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (“An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ 
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place 
of business is relevant in this connection.”). 
 262 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011). 
 263 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). 
 264 Williams v. Romarm, S.A., No. 13-7022, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12368, at *1–2 
(D.C. Cir. July 1, 2014) (“Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence addressed the precise issue 
we face today and concluded a foreign corporation’s sale to a distributor, without more, is 
insufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary for a court to exert personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation, even if its product ultimately causes injury in the forum 
state.”). 
 265 Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115.  Among the likely bases for jurisdiction, it seems virtually 
certain that the defendant was domiciled in Georgia.  See Milliken, 311 U.S. 457. 
 266 Id. at 1125 (“Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with 
Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had 
Nevada connections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plaintiff’s forum connections 
to the defendant and makes those connections ‘decisive’ in the jurisdictional analysis.”). 
 267 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (“ . . . even if the 
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting 
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years later – in an opinion that same Justice wrote – the Court overruled 
itself and said that sovereignty concerns were not part of the jurisdictional 
calculus.268 
This proposed rule giving the plaintiff at least one reasonable forum 
would call for re-examination of the results in only two Supreme Court 
cases.  One is J. McIntyre.  There is no rational justification for preventing 
a forum-resident plaintiff, injured in his home state by a machine that 
arrived in that state due to the marketing efforts of a foreign defendant, 
from suing at home.269  In the name of ensuring due process to the foreign 
defendant, the Court effectively extinguished the plaintiff’s cause of action 
with no process.270 
The other is World-Wide Volkswagen.  World-Wide is perhaps closer 
than J. McIntyre. New York – where the plaintiffs bought the car – might 
have sufficed as a forum, because the dealer and the distributor (whom the 
Supreme Court found not to have contacts with the injury state of 
Oklahoma) might have had jurisdiction over all four defendants, 
particularly given that the defendants at the top of the distribution chain 
(the manufacturer and importer) abandoned their efforts to be dismissed 
from the Oklahoma action, thus essentially conceding that they were 
subject to general jurisdiction there.271  However, under Goodyear the 
defendants at the top of the distribution chain would be foolish to concede 
general jurisdiction under the “essentially at home” test.272  Moreover, 
Oklahoma contained all of the physical evidence and New York was no 
longer the plaintiffs’ home.273  The defendants had no apparent desire to 
litigate the case in New York.  The true purpose of dismissing the two 
defendants at the end of the distribution chain was to create full diversity 
                                                                                                                                     
as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power 
to render a valid judgment.”). 
 268 Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 
n.10 (1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal 
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”). 
 269 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, (2011). 
 270 Id. 
 271 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288 n.3 (“Volkswagen also entered a special appearance in 
the District Court, but unlike World-Wide and Seaway did not seek review in the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma and is not a petitioner here. Both Volkswagen and Audi remain as 
defendants in the litigation pending before the District Court in Oklahoma.”). 
 272 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 273 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288 (noting that petitioners were en route to their new home 
in Arizona when the accident occurred). 
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of citizenship and remove the case to the more defendant-friendly 
Oklahoma federal court.274 
This modest proposal would not call for a different result in either 
Goodyear or Daimler.  The facts as pled in both cases are tragic.  
Nevertheless, acting outside of the United States carries some risk, and not 
having the availability of a U.S. forum is one of them, hence the limitation 
of the proposal to specific, not general, jurisdiction cases. 
Although the following cases are not wrong as a matter of due 
process, some Supreme Court minimum contacts cases upholding 
jurisdiction could have been decided the other way without doing violence 
to this modest proposal.  In Burger King, the plaintiff – a large national 
fast food chain – reasonably could have sued its franchisee where it was 
doing business, rather than at the plaintiff’s Florida headquarters.275  In the 
defamation cases, Calder and Keeton, the plaintiffs there had other 
available forums, notably the headquarters of the offending publications.  
However, the Calder plaintiff’s desire to sue at home where her reputation 
was besmirched was easy to understand.  The Keeton plaintiff, however, 
had no connection to the forum state of New Hampshire; she was clearly 
forum shopping for a long statute of limitations.276 
In the end, the modest proposal to give the plaintiff’s a reasonable 
domestic forum when the liability-creating events occur in the United 
States would do little violence to the results in the post-International Shoe 
cases.  But it would restore International Shoe’s promise that jurisdiction 
rests on “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”277 
                                                                                                                                     
 274 It worked.  See Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The 
Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122 (1993).  It clearly would not work now, as diversity 
removal is prohibited in cases that have been pending in state court more than a year.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c).  There also was case law at the time World-Wide was decided that 
prohibited removal if the dismissal was for a reason that was not voluntary on the plaintiffs’ 
part.  See, e.g., Debry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 275 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985). Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783, 788–89 (1983) (“The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a 
California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television 
career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the 
brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her 
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point 
both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper 
in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”). 
 276 See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is our Need for a Judgments-Recognition 
Convention and What Should we Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 167, 
198 (1998). 
 277 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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CONCLUSION 
The daylight has been dimming for the minimum contacts test since 
the Court’s 1980 decision in World-Wide Volkswagen.  There the Court 
rejected the notion that forum convenience was necessarily central to the 
jurisdictional calculus and revived state sovereignty as a critical element, 
which was in tension with International Shoe’s emphasis on the fairness 
and reasonableness of the chosen forum.  Though the Court attempted to 
back away from the sovereignty language in World-Wide, the damage was 
done because the Court didn’t repudiate either World-Wide’s result or its 
exclusive focus on the defendant.  With the Court’s current campaign to 
roll back corporate general jurisdiction to one or a very few forums, some 
plaintiffs are certain to be left without a practical forum in which to pursue 
cases even when the liability-creating events took place in the United 
States; indeed this is precisely what happened to the J. McIntyre plaintiff. 
As a result, we are left with a rigid jurisdictional structure that looks 
remarkably like the nineteenth and early twentieth century structure that 
the Court claimed to have torn down to erect the minimum contacts test.  
Perhaps even jurisdictional doctrine is now more rigid than ever.  Some of 
those pre-minimum contacts decision seem now remarkable for their 
solicitude of the plaintiff’s need to find a reasonable forum, the very 
consideration that the Court has sought to banish in its four recent 
jurisdictional opinions.  While there is no reason to think that the Supreme 
Court will abandon the minimum contacts language, as a test it is now 
barely recognizable.  If the law of personal jurisdiction is to be re-
grounded in the promise of fair play and substantial justice that was the 
foundation of the minimum contacts test, the Court must end its exclusive 
focus on defendants and ensure that plaintiffs have at least one reasonable 
forum to pursue civil cases in which the liability-creating events occur in 
the United States. 
 
